U.S. Escalates Warnings on China’s Rapid Nuclear Expansion Amid Post-New START Uncertainty
GENEVA, February 23, 2026 — When Christopher Yeaw stepped to the podium at the Palace of Nations on Monday, the treaty that had constrained the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals for fifteen years had been dead for exactly eighteen days. His message to China was direct: the next one cannot be built without you.
The United States has issued its starkest public warning yet about Beijing’s accelerating nuclear weapons buildup, framing it as the central challenge to global strategic stability in an era suddenly devoid of major arms control constraints. Speaking at the UN-backed Conference on Disarmament on February 23, 2026, the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation delivered pointed remarks accusing Beijing of an “unprecedented, deliberate, rapid, and opaque” expansion of its nuclear capabilities.
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“We believe China could reach parity with the United States and Russia within the next four to five years,” Yeaw told delegates, though he declined to specify whether “parity” meant matching deployed warhead levels or total stockpiles. His statement represents a sharpened U.S. posture just weeks after the New START treaty expired on February 5, leaving Washington and Moscow without legally binding limits on their strategic forces for the first time since the early 1970s.
The timing is anything but coincidental. With the old bipolar arms control architecture in ruins, the United States is racing to engage Beijing before competitive dynamics take hold—and before China’s nuclear modernization renders traditional assumptions about strategic superiority obsolete.
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A New Era After New START’s Demise
For more than five decades, successive arms control agreements placed ceilings on nuclear warheads and delivery systems while creating predictability through verification and data exchanges. New START, signed in 2010 and extended once in 2021, capped each country at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and limited deployed launchers through on-site inspections and regular data exchanges.
Those mechanisms mattered as much as the numbers themselves. Inspections allowed each side to confirm the other’s declared forces, while notifications reduced uncertainty about routine military movements. Even after Russia suspended participation in inspections in 2023, U.S. officials reported Moscow remained below the treaty’s limits through its expiration.
The treaty’s non-extension was not sudden. Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed last September that Moscow and Washington continue observing New START’s numerical limits for one year after expiration, though without the verification measures. The Trump administration did not take up the offer. On February 5, President Donald Trump posted on social media that “we should have our Nuclear Experts work on a new, improved and modernized Treaty.”
Speaking to the Conference on Disarmament the following day, Under Secretary of State Thomas DiNanno laid out Washington’s revised goals: bring China into arms control discussions for the first time, and limit all Russian and U.S. nuclear warheads—not just the deployed strategic warheads captured by New START.
Both objectives make strategic sense. Both will be extraordinarily difficult to achieve.
The China Challenge: From Minimum Deterrence to Strategic Parity
When U.S. and Russian negotiators sat across from each other during the Cold War, they managed mutual vulnerability through symmetry. China presents a fundamentally different problem: a rising power with a rapidly expanding arsenal, no history of arms control participation, and deep distrust of American intentions.
The numbers tell the story. China’s nuclear stockpile has climbed from roughly 250 warheads in 2015 to more than 600 operational warheads today, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and U.S. Defense Department assessments. The pace is accelerating: annual additions have reached 80 to 100 warheads since 2023, with projections of 1,000 by 2030 and as many as 1,500 by 2035.
What worries U.S. officials most is not just the quantity but the infrastructure. Satellite imagery has revealed over 300 new missile silos at sprawling complexes in Yumen, Hami, and Ordos—facilities that, once fully populated, could dramatically raise alert levels and improve survivability against a preemptive strike. For the first time, analysts judge that a subset of Chinese missiles now carry mated warheads during peacetime patrols, ending Beijing’s long-standing practice of keeping warheads stored separately from delivery vehicles.
Yeaw told delegates in Geneva that Beijing is “moving toward having sufficient fissile material to produce more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.” The land-based force now includes DF-41 solid-fuel ICBMs designed for multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, while six Type 094 Jin-class submarines conduct near-continuous patrols armed with JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
The H-20 stealth bomber remains in advanced development. When operational later this decade, it will give China its first genuine intercontinental, low-observable air-delivered capability, completing a maturing nuclear triad capable of threatening U.S. and allied targets on short notice.
“We are watching the most rapid nuclear expansion by any state in decades,” a senior State Department official told reporters in Geneva, speaking on condition of anonymity. “The question is not whether China will achieve parity with the United States and Russia. The question is when, and whether we can build a framework to manage that new reality before competition spirals out of control.”
The Lop Nur Allegation: Seismic Signals and Strategic Mistrust
Yeaw’s address also revived a contentious allegation that has simmered between Washington and Beijing for nearly six years: that China conducted a clandestine low-yield nuclear test at its Lop Nur site in June 2020.
The U.S. case rests on a seismic event detected on June 22, 2020, by a monitoring station in Kazakhstan operated by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The signal registered magnitude 2.75 and was traced back to Lop Nur, more than 700 kilometers from the detection point.
“There is very little possibility that it is anything other than an explosion, a singular explosion,” Yeaw said at a Hudson Institute event earlier this month. “It is quite consistent with what you would expect from a nuclear explosive test.”
Under Secretary DiNanno went further, alleging that China used a method known as “decoupling” to reduce the seismic signature of an underground explosion—effectively masking the test because it knew such activity would breach international commitments.
China has rejected the allegations outright. At the Geneva conference, Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Shen Jian called the U.S. claims “completely unfounded” and accused Washington of “creating excuses to restart its own nuclear testing.”
Between these positions sits the CTBTO itself. The organization confirmed its International Monitoring System detected “two very small seismic events” spaced twelve seconds apart that day, but stated the signals were far below the threshold at which its system can confidently identify a nuclear explosion. “Subsequent, more detailed analyses have not altered that determination,” the CTBTO said.
The Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies examined satellite imagery of the Lop Nur site and found no conclusive evidence to support or disprove the U.S. allegation.
For arms control experts, the disagreement exposes a deeper vulnerability: the global nuclear order is under strain precisely when it is most needed. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, negotiated in 1996, has never entered into force. The United States, China, and Russia all signed but never ratified it. Without full approval, the monitoring body cannot enforce tougher checks.
Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, warned that any U.S. resumption of testing would set off a chain reaction. “The United States should begin negotiations with Russia and China aimed at strengthening confidence-building measures in order to prevent the resumption of nuclear testing,” Kimball told reporters.
The Multipolar Dilemma: Can Arms Control Adapt?
The central challenge facing Yeaw and his counterparts is whether Cold War-era arms control concepts can be adapted to a genuinely multipolar nuclear world.
Bilateral agreements between Washington and Moscow historically rested on the principle of equality. But how would equality apply in a three-way arrangement that includes China? Would U.S. and Russian negotiators accept a Chinese demand for numerical parity? Would the United States be comfortable with an agreement allowing Russia and China each to have as many nuclear weapons as the U.S. military?
Russia complicates the math further by insisting that British and French nuclear forces be included in any expanded framework. Yeaw signaled some openness to this position, stating on February 17 that “all nuclear weapons states need to be involved” in the arms control process—a formulation that would bring even more actors to an already crowded table.
Yet even advocates of multilateral arms control acknowledge the obstacles. China’s arsenal, while growing rapidly, remains significantly smaller than those of the United States and Russia. The United States today maintains approximately 3,700 nuclear warheads; Russia roughly 4,300, not counting warheads retired but awaiting dismantlement. Britain and France together hold some 500.
“Why would Beijing accept caps that lock in permanent inferiority?” asked one European diplomat familiar with the discussions. “From their perspective, the United States and Russia are asking China to freeze while they maintain massive advantages—and while the U.S. builds new missile defenses that could theoretically neutralize China’s smaller force.”
That last point is critical. Beijing and Moscow have long made clear their concern about U.S. missile defense developments. In 2025, Trump announced the “Golden Dome” missile defense program with the goal of creating an “impenetrable” defense over the United States that could defeat attacks by China or Russia as well as rogue states. Initial cost estimates exceed half a trillion dollars, with space-based interceptors envisioned as a key element.
During his first administration, the Defense Department’s 2019 Missile Defense Review ruled out limits on missile defense, stating that “the United States will not accept any limitation or constraint on the development or deployment of missile defense capabilities.” Trump has now broadened that ambition. If his administration maintains the refusal to negotiate on missile defense, experts say, it gives up a major topic that might draw China and Russia to the table.
Diplomatic Maneuvers: Meetings Without Negotiations
Despite the rhetorical fireworks, diplomatic channels remain open—though what exactly they will produce is unclear.
A senior State Department official confirmed that U.S. representatives met with a Russian delegation in Geneva on Monday and were scheduled to meet with Chinese representatives on Tuesday. The official described the talks as “preparatory” rather than formal negotiations, noting that the United States had already conducted bilateral discussions with Britain and France. “Taking discussions to the five permanent members of the Security Council was the next logical step,” the official said.
China’s public position, however, remains unchanged. Ambassador Shen reiterated this week that Beijing would not participate in trilateral arms control negotiations with Moscow and Washington “at this stage,” calling such demands “neither fair, nor reasonable, nor realistic.”
“The size of China’s nuclear arsenal is not in the same league as countries with the largest nuclear arsenals,” Shen told delegates. “Certain countries persistently distort and smear China’s nuclear policy.”
Privately, some U.S. officials express cautious optimism. The fact that Chinese representatives showed up for any discussion—even a preparatory one—represents a shift from previous years, when Beijing refused to engage at all. In June 2020, when the first Trump administration placed Chinese flags on empty chairs at arms control talks in Vienna, the Chinese did not appear and termed the ploy “unserious, unprofessional, and unappealing.”
“We’re not expecting Beijing to sign up for caps tomorrow,” the senior State Department official said. “But we need to start building habits of dialogue, transparency, and confidence. That takes time. The alternative is an unconstrained arms race that benefits no one.”
Regional Ramifications: Allies Watch Nervously
For U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific, the stakes could hardly be higher. Japan, Australia, and South Korea rely on American extended deterrence commitments—the promise that U.S. nuclear forces will protect them from attack. As China’s arsenal grows more capable and survivable, some allies quietly question whether that guarantee remains credible.
A 2024 Pentagon report on Chinese military power noted that Beijing’s nuclear modernization “will place acute pressure on U.S. extended deterrence commitments.” If China can hold U.S. cities at risk while fielding forces capable of surviving a first strike, the calculus of intervention in a Taiwan Strait crisis or Korean Peninsula contingency shifts in fundamental ways.
Yet arms control experts caution against focusing exclusively on numbers. U.S. submarines are quieter, U.S. bombers are stealthier, U.S. command and control is more resilient. But the trajectory matters, and the trajectory shows Beijing closing gaps faster than anticipated.
For now, the trajectory points toward continued expansion. The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force will likely finish populating its three new silo fields before 2028, giving China a survivable mix of mobile and fixed ICBMs at higher alert levels. Type 096 submarine upgrades will shift a larger share of the deterrent to sea, complicating U.S. anti-submarine warfare planning. The H-20 bomber will add a third leg to the triad.
Absent arms control constraints, analysts estimate China could scale to roughly 2,000 warheads in the 2030s simply by loading its new silos and MIRV-capable missiles.
Pathways Forward: From Bilateral to Multilateral
If the Trump administration is serious about nuclear arms control, experts say, it faces a series of difficult choices.
One option is to pursue a renewed bilateral agreement with Russia while continuing efforts to engage China separately. New START took one year to negotiate and ran hundreds of pages; a successor would require sustained technical work on verification, definitions, and counting rules. Putin’s September 2025 offer to observe New START limits for one year, though lacking verification, suggests Moscow may be open to interim arrangements.
A second option is to use and invigorate the established P5 process—the five permanent UN Security Council members: the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France. Washington and Moscow continue to observe a 1988 agreement on pre-notifying strategic ballistic missile launches, while Russia and China have a similar bilateral arrangement. Those agreements could provide the basis for a multilateral notification regime that builds habits of transparency without requiring immediate caps on forces.
A third option involves addressing issues the United States would prefer to keep off the table. Missile defense is the most obvious. Chinese and Russian strategic ballistic missiles could easily overwhelm the 44 ground-based interceptors currently defending the U.S. homeland, but both countries worry more about future capabilities—particularly space-based systems envisioned under “Golden Dome.” If Washington wants Beijing and Moscow to negotiate, it may have to discuss limits on or transparency about those systems.
Long-range conventional strike weapons present another difficult question. Russia has long rejected U.S. bids to negotiate on nonstrategic nuclear weapons, calling them an important offset to NATO’s conventional advantages. But those conventional advantages include precisely the long-range strike systems the Pentagon views as essential to power projection. Would Washington agree to discuss limits on systems like conventional ICBMs or hypersonic missiles? That would be a hard sell at the Pentagon.
“There are no easy answers here,” said a Brookings Institution analysis published this month. “If the Trump administration is serious about nuclear arms control, it may find that it has to choose between a good bilateral U.S.-Russia agreement while continuing to seek to engage Beijing, as opposed to pursuing an all-but-unattainable three-way arrangement with China. In order to achieve its goals in constraining nuclear weapons, the administration will have to decide whether it is prepared to address missile defense and long-range conventional strike weapons. Any negotiations will prove complex and arduous. The administration will need to start soon, not again wait until its final year in office, if the president wants to achieve something significant.”
The Stability Paradox
There is an irony in the current moment that Yeaw and his counterparts well understand. For decades, U.S. policy rested on the premise that verifiable limits reduce the risk of nuclear catastrophe. New START’s expiration marks a departure from that framework. Whether the United States, Russia, and China can construct a new system of restraint will shape nuclear risk for decades to come.
The stakes are not abstract. Without constraints, uncertainty grows, incentives shift, and the margin for error narrows. Each side builds to hedge against worst-case assumptions about the others. None can be certain what the others are doing. And in a crisis, those uncertainties could prove fatal.
Yeaw’s Geneva address was designed to signal U.S. resolve to lead on arms control even as the old order crumbles. But leadership requires followership. Beijing’s response to Washington’s overtures—whether engagement, rejection, or something in between—will define the strategic landscape for the rest of this decade and beyond.
As one European diplomat put it: “We spent fifty years managing bipolar nuclear rivalry. Now we have to learn how to manage multipolar nuclear competition with no playbook, no trust, and no time to waste. The only thing worse than difficult negotiations is no negotiations at all.”
with inputs from
Associated Press: “US warns of China’s nuclear expansion at UN conference”, February 23, 2026
Reuters: “New START treaty expires as US, Russia blame each other”, February 5, 2026
Brookings Institution: “What Comes After New START? Options for Nuclear Arms Control in a Multipolar Era”, February 2026
Arms Control Association: “Arms Control Today: New START Succession and Chinese Nuclear Modernization”, January-February 2026
Center for Strategic and International Studies: “China’s Nuclear Modernization: Tracking the Buildout”, updated February 2026
State Department Press Office: “Remarks by Assistant Secretary Christopher Yeaw at the Conference on Disarmament”, February 23, 2026
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